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1. Introduction 
 In the literature on multinational enterprises (MNEs), increasing focus has been 
given to modeling the endogenous choice of firm structure.1 When servicing an overseas 
market, a firm can either export from its parent country or establish a subsidiary abroad 
through foreign direct investment (FDI). The key trade-off between these two options is 
the “proximity-concentration trade-off”, that is, balancing the reduction in transport costs 
from replacing exports with FDI against the additional fixed costs of establishing the 
overseas subsidiary.2 Despite the central role this choice plays in the FDI literature, it is 
missing from the literature on tax competition. 
This paper fills the existing gap by analyzing tax competition between countries 
for a mobile firm that chooses both the location of its headquarters and its market entry 
mode (as a single-plant exporter or as a multi-plant MNE). In doing so, we show that tax 
competition provides a heretofore unrecognized benefit b cause it can induce the world 
welfare-maximizing entry mode even when this does not arise in a no-tax equilibrium. 
Furthermore, we are able to separate tax incentives into those used to attract a firm’s 
headquarters and those used to manipulate its entry mode. Finally, we show that since the 
firm’s entry decision depends on the proximity-conce tration trade-off, so too do 
equilibrium taxes. Thus, equilibrium taxes depend o transport costs and the costs of 
establishing an overseas subsidiary. Standard models f tax competition treat the entry 
mode as exogenous and often neglect the impact of nati nal policies on headquarters 
location. Therefore, they are unable to consider thse issues. 
                                                
1 A handful of examples include Markusen and Venables (2000), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), 
Eicher and Kang (2005), and Bergstrand and Egger (2006). See Markusen (2002) for a more 
comprehensive review of this literature. 
2 Evidence by Brainard (1997), Blonigen (2002), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and others gives 
support for this trade-off. See Blonigen (2005) for a recent survey of the empirical literature on FDI. 
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Locational competition through national tax policies has long been an issue for 
policy makers. Sinn (2003, p. 2) points to an increasing interest among firms in 
transferring “their operations to countries with low wages and low taxes to hold their own 
in the increasingly intensive international product and cost competition”. In recognition 
of this, at the 2000 European Council meeting in Lisbon, the EU member countries 
agreed to measure competitiveness using a benchmark method that includes taxation as a 
key factor. Beyond the distributional consequences of locational competition, there is 
also a wide-spread concern that uncoordinated tax policies have detrimental welfare 
effects from a global point of view. Such concerns prompted the OECD (1998, p. 14) to 
warn that globalization has “the negative effects of opening up new ways by which 
companies and individuals can minimize and avoid taxes and in which countries can 
exploit these new opportunities by developing tax policies aimed primarily at diverting 
financial and other geographically mobile capital. These actions induce potential 
distortions in the patterns of trade and investment and reduce global welfare.” 
This attention in policy circles has been matched by attention from researchers. 
Beginning with the seminal work of Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986), the open economy public finance literature has analyzed the cases in which 
strategic tax competition impacts both the international allocation of capital and the 
efficiency of taxation. The standard result in these models is that tax competition triggers 
a race to the bottom as governments lower tax ratesto attract mobile capital.3 This leads 
to inefficiently low tax revenues (and eventually to an underprovision of public goods), 
even if the distribution of capital across countries is unchanged. As a consequence, 
                                                
3 See Wilson (1999) and Gresik (2001) for surveys of this literature. 
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international coordination of national tax policies becomes attractive from an integrated 
point of view. 
A key assumption in the traditional public finance lit rature is that one of 
perfectly competitive markets (cf. Bucovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1991 and Kanbur and 
Keen, 1993). This renders the traditional literature different from more recent theoretical 
contributions, which address the issue of tax competition from a new trade theory 
perspective and investigate the role of profit taxaion in an imperfectly competitive 
environment. Two motives of strategic tax policies are emphasized in this literature, 
namely (i) attraction of a mobile firm’s headquarters and (ii) attraction of foreign direct 
investment from outside the world. 
High profile examples have brought attention to the first motive. For example, in 
2003, the Australian firm James Hardie moved its headquarters from Australia to the 
Netherlands because of the favorable Dutch tax policies. Such anecdotic evidence 
substantiates the concern that tax differentials can impact the choice of headquarters 
location, not just the allocation of capital across borders. Changes in the headquarters 
location affect the tax jurisdiction of profits. Inparticular, if an MNE operates a 
production plant in two countries, the parent country can tax profits earned in both 
locations whereas the host country can only tax the profits generated locally. Although 
several theoretical contributions focus on the roleof tax competition for the headquarters 
of mobile producers,4 the discussion of the second motive – regional tax competition for 
FDI from outside the world – is predominant in the recent tax competition literature.5 The 
central outcome of existing theoretical studies in th s field is similar to the key insight of 
                                                
4 Two notable examples are Janeba (1998) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004). 
5 See for example Haufler and Wooton (1999, 2006), Raff (2004) or Bjorvatn and Eckel (forthcoming). 
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the (more traditional) public finance literature: Non-cooperative national tax policies 
trigger a race to the bottom in profit taxation and lead to a suboptimal outcome (in terms 
of world welfare). Again, this renders coordination f national tax policies beneficial 
from an integrated point of view. 
We set up a two-country model with imperfect competition in the goods market 
and study the impact of strategic tax competition on b th headquarters location of an 
internationally mobile producer and its mode of foreign market entry. A simultaneous 
consideration of these two issues renders our analysis different from existing studies on 
non-cooperative profit taxation. Accounting for oligopolistic competition between the 
internationally mobile producer and national firms constitutes a further difference to 
existing work, which primarily looks at the monopoly case (cf. Haufler and Wooton, 
1999; 2006; Raff, 2004). An oligopoly structure is particularly important in our analysis, 
as it allows us to study the effect of the mobile firm’s decision about its mode of foreign 
market entry on the profits of domestic competitors. This effect is accounted for by 
policy makers and therefore introduces a new facet to host country taxation that is quite 
distinct from the competition for headquarters of mobile producers or the competition for 
FDI from outside the world. It is this facet that differentiates our paper also from Lahiri 
and Ono (1998) and Bjorvatn and Eckel (forthcoming) who account for oligopolistic 
competition between foreign MNEs and local firms, but do not consider the role of tax 
competition in affecting the endogenous choice of entry mode.6 
As a key result of our analysis, we find that tax competition can be welfare-
improving. This relates our work to a sizable literature which points towards the potential 
                                                
6 Ferrett and Wooton (2005) also consider tax competition for FDI in an oligopoly model. However, in 
contrast to our analysis, they assume that all competitors are mobile and they keep the mode of market 
entry exogenous. 
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benefits of an uncoordinated tax game. Examples include the Leviathan models of 
corrupt governments (such as Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, and Edwards and Keen, 
1996), information signaling (Bond and Samuelson, 1986), increased output due to 
subsidization (Davies, 2005) and reduced average cost of public goods (Black and Hoyt, 
1989). Our paper adds to this literature by pointing owards a new channel through which 
tax competition can be beneficial: changes in the mode of foreign market entry. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set up our basic model. Section 3 
solves the benchmark case of a no-tax equilibrium. Section 4 introduces tax competition, 
derives the Nash equilibrium tax policies and confrts welfare levels under tax 
competition with those in the no-tax equilibrium. Section 5 extends the analysis by 
relaxing several simplifying assumptions and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 Consider a two country world with two sectors. The two countries do not differ in 
their economic fundamentals, such as technology, factor endowments and preferences.7 
They are populated by L units of labor, which are inelastically supplied in perfectly 
competitive and internationally segmented factor makets. By assumption, each country 
,i A B=  diversifies production and provides each of the two sectors’ goods. The first 
sector produces good Y, a numéraire good that is manufactured using labor in a constant 
returns to scale technology and sold under perfect competition. We normalize units so 
that the unit labor requirement of Y is one. Since there are no transport costs for good Y, 
                                                
7 The symmetry assumption is not critical for our results. It is imposed for the mere reason of notation l 
simplicity. This becomes clear in Section 5, where factor endowment differences are accounted for. 
 6 
under diversified production the equilibrium wage rate in each country is constant and 
equal to one.  
In the second sector, three imperfectly-competitive firms produce a homogenous 
good X using labor in a constant returns to scale technology. These “industrial-sector” 
firms operate under Cournot competition. The unit labor requirement for production of 
good X is c. Two of these firms are national in scope and are exogenously assigned to 
each of the two countries. They produce and sell thir output only in a single location. In 
models of endogenous firm structure, the presence of national competitors is a standard 
feature.8 A further component of the national firms’ costs are fixed costs 0f >  (in units 
of the numéraire good) which are invested to establish a production plant. The third firm, 
which is the firm of particular interest in the following analysis, acts as an international 
producer and faces two choices the others do not. The first choice is where to locate its 
headquarters. We designate the location of the headquarters as the third firm’s parent 
country. Second, unlike the national firms, this “international producer” operates in both 
markets. It can do so either by choosing to be an exporter (the EXP-organization) or a 
multinational enterprise (the MNE-organization). As has been widely discussed in the 
FDI literature, there are advantages and disadvantages to both. 
Under the EXP-organization, like the national firms, the international producer 
incurs a fixed cost f in its parent country. However, when serving the ov rseas host 
market, it must pay transport costs of ρ  per unit exported. Under the MNE-organization, 
the international producer establishes a plant bothin e parent and in the overseas host 
                                                
8 See, for example, Markusen (2002). Accounting for trade of the national producers would not change our 
main conclusions. Therefore, in the interest of simplicity, we assume that these firms do not export. 
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country.9 Doing so allows it to avoid the transport costs of exporting. However, 
establishing this overseas affiliate’s plant requires an additional fixed cost af . Thus, 
without taxation the international producer faces the well-known proximity-concentration 
trade-off, evidence of which is provided by Brainard (1997). 
 In our analysis, the proximity-concentration trade-off also depends on national tax 
policies. In particular, the MNE-organization exposes the international producer to host-
country taxation, a feature which plays a central role in our tax competition story and 
something not found in tax competition models considering the location decision of 
exporting firms (cf. Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). 
With respect to the ranking of fixed costs, we follow recent contributions in the 
FDI literature and impose the following parameter rest iction: 
Assumption 1: af f> . 
Assumption 1, which will be relaxed in the robustnes analysis of Section 5, 
implies that it is more costly to establish a plant in the host country than in the MNE’s 
parent country (cf. Markusen, 2002, and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). Note that 
since an MNE-organized firm produces its good in both l cations, it is a horizontal firm 
in the tradition of Markusen (1984). Evidence of the predominance of horizontal FDI is 
provided by Markusen and Maskus (2002) and Blonigen, Davies and Head (2003). 
Turning to the demand side of the economy, we assume that the utility of the 







U aD Y= − +  (1) 
                                                
9 Note that for ease of discussion, we refer to the non-parent country as the host country, both when it 
literally hosts an MNE’s subsidiary and when it is he target of exports from the parent country. 
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where iD  is i’s consumption of X and 
D
iY  is i’s consumption of Y. Denoting the price of 
good X in country i by pi, the budget constraint of the representative consumer is: 
 Di i i ip D Y M+ =  (2) 
where Mi denotes total income. Mi is the sum of labor income, profits of firms 
headquartered in i, and, in the presence of taxes, tax revenue which is redistributed by the 
government in a lump-sum fashion. 
Using the consumer’s first order conditions, we derive inverse demand for X in 
country i: 
 i ip a D= −  (3) 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into (1), we candetermine indirect utility for the 








−= +  (4) 
With respect to the available tax instruments, we assume that each country i can 
set a non-discriminatory local profit tax rate ti that applies to profits resulting from 
domestic production. In addition, when a country i is the parent of an MNE, it can apply 
the tax rate τi to the overseas profits of the MNE. The relationship between τi and ti will 
depend on the double tax relief method used by country i, a topic we discuss in Section 4. 
 Combining the different model elements implies that profits of a national firm 
located in country i are: 
 ( ) ( )1Ni i i it p c x fπ = − − −    (5) 
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where xi indicates its production level and superscript N refers to “national”. The 
international producer’s profits are conditional on its organizational structure. When it 
headquarters in country i its profits are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 if 
1 1 if 
EXP EXP MNE
i i i i j j i i
i
MNE EXP MNE
i i i i i j j j a i i
t p c q p c q f
t p c q f t p c q f
π ρ π π
π
π τ π π
  = − − + − − − >  = 
 = − − − + − − − − <     
(6) 
where iq  and jq  are the quantities it sells in the two countries and the EXP and MNE 
superscripts refer to the “EXP-organization” and “MNE-organization”, respectively.10  
To simplify the analysis, we make two assumptions to guarantee interior 
solutions. First, we assume that a c> , i.e. the representative consumers’ marginal 
willingness to pay exceeds the firms’ marginal cost of production for the first unit of 
output. Without this, no firm will choose to produce in equilibrium. Second, in order to 
guarantee non-negative equilibrium profits, this difference must be sufficiently large 
relative to the fixed costs. Therefore, we assume 2( ) 9 max{ , }aa c f f− >  throughout our 
analysis. 
 
3. A Benchmark Case of No Profit Taxes 
In the next section, the focus will be on the endogenous choice of tax rates. For 
now, however, we exogenously set tax rates equal to zer  to determine the firm structure 
and the welfare levels in the no-tax equilibrium. This provides a useful benchmark for a 
discussion of the welfare implications of tax competition. 
                                                
10 Recall that under the EXP-organization, both iq  and jq  are produced in country i, whereas under MNE-
organization, the international firm produces in both countries to service local consumers. In both cases, 
total supply of industrial goods in countries  and j can be denoted by i i iX x q= +  and j j jX x q= + , 
respectively. 
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Taking taxes as given, the game is played out in two stages. First, the 
international producer chooses its mode of foreign market penetration and its 
headquarters location.11 After that, the three firms simultaneously choose their output 
levels, exchange takes place, and payoffs are realized. We solve the game through 
backward induction. 
3.1 The Tax-free MNE Subgame Equilibrium 
 We first analyze the subgame in which the internatio l producer chooses the 
MNE-organization. In this case, if the firm headquarters in country i, since marginal costs 
are the same equilibrium outputs are the same out of each plant regardless of whether it is 
operated by a national firm or the MNE. Using the appropriate first-order conditions 
resulting from the maximization of profits (5) and (6), the equilibrium quantities are: 
 ( ) / 3i j i jx x q q a c= = = = − . (7) 
Substituting these in inverse demand (2) yields equilibri m prices: 
 ( 2 ) / 3i jp p a c= = + . (8) 
Therefore profits of the national firms are: 
 2( ) / 9N Ni j a c fπ π= = − − . (9) 
The MNE meanwhile earns equilibrium profits of: 
 22( ) / 9MNEi i aa c f fπ π= = − − − . (10) 
By virtue of (4), utilitarian welfare in the parent country i is given by: 
 25( ) / 9 2MNEi aV a c f f L= − − − + . (11) 
In the host country j, welfare is: 
                                                
11 Recall that countries do not differ in their economic fundamentals. Hence they are symmetric ex ante. 
However, after the international firm chooses its headquarters location (and its mode of foreign market 
entry), there is an ex post asymmetry between the two economies. 
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 2( ) / 3MNEjV a c f L= − − + . (12) 
Combining (11) and (12) yields: 
 22( ) / 9 0MNE MNE MNEi j aV V V a c f f∆ ≡ − = − − − >  (13) 
Thus, when the international producer is an MNE and t xes are zero, a country gains by 
having the headquarters of the MNE because its citizens enjoy the benefits of the MNE’s 
local and overseas profits. 
3.2 The Tax-free Exporter Subgame Equilibrium 
 Now we analyze the subgame in which the internatiol producer has chosen to 
be a firm headquartered in country i that exports to country j. Using the first-order 
conditions resulting from the maximization of profits (5) and (6), we find that the 
equilibrium outcome depends critically on the level of transport costs. Specifically, the 
equilibrium quantities sold in the parent country i are: 
 ( ) / 3i ix q a c= = − , (14) 
while the quantity sold by the host country’s national firm is 
 
( ) / 3







=  − >
. (15) 
The equilibrium level of exports is: 
 










where ( ) / 2a cρ ≡ − . Thus, if transport costs exceed this cutoff level, the exporter has no 
incentive to export and j’s national firm is free to act as a monopolist. Using these results 
in the inverse demand functions yields the following prices: 




( 2 ) / 3







=  + >
. (18) 
Plugging these into the profit equations then gives: 




( ) / 9
( ) / 4
N
j
a c f if
a c f if
ρ ρ ρπ
ρ ρ
 − + − ≤






( ) / 9 ( 2 ) / 9





a c a c f if
a c f if
π ρ ρ ρ
π
π ρ ρ
 = − + − − − ≤
=  = − − >
. (21) 
Looking at indirect utility of the representative consumer in (4), in the parent country i, 




4( ) / 9 ( 2 ) / 9 2
4( ) / 9 2
EXP
i
a c a c f L if
V
a c f L if
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
 − + − − − + ≤
=  − − + >
. (22) 




2( ) /18 ( ) / 9
3( ) / 8
EXP
j
a c a c f L if
V
a c f L if
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
 − − + − + − + ≤= 
− − + >
. (23) 
Using these, we can calculate the relative gain from being the parent country i instead of 




4( ) 8 ( ) 5 /18
5( ) / 72
EXP EXP EXP
i j
a c a c f if
V V V
a c f if
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
 − − − + − ≤∆ ≡ − = 
− − >
. (24) 
It is unclear in general whether the parent country is better off or not if the international 
producer has the EXP-organization. If 0ρ = , then welfare is strictly higher for the parent 
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country. However, if ρ  increases, then the welfare differential EXPV∆  declines when 
ρ ρ<  and remains unchanged for ρ ρ≥ . If ρ ρ= , then (24) reduces to: 
 25( ) / 72EXPV a c f∆ = − −  (25) 
which may be positive or negative, depending on the siz  of fixed cost parameter f. Being 
the headquarters location has three consequences. First, the parent country gains since 
profits of the international producer enter its welfare. Second, if 0ρ > , there is stronger 
competition in the parent country, leading to higher consumer surplus as compared to the 
host country. Third, stronger competition reduces profits of the national firm. This third 
effect counteracts the first two ones and it dominates if fixed set-up costs f are 
sufficiently high. 
3.3 The Location and Entry Mode Decision 
 When countries are identical, the firm is indifferent between them. Hence, to 
determine the headquarters location, we add the following assumption: 
Assumption 2: In the case of indifference, the international producer locates in 
country A and chooses an MNE-organization. 
Given the ex ante symmetry between countries, the choice of entry mode reduces 
to comparing the profits in (10) and (21). If ρ ρ≥ , profits are strictly greater under 
MNE-organization. This is because foreign sales of the international producer fall to zero 
under EXP-organization if transport costs are too high. As a result, the only way to earn 
positive overseas profits is to choose the MNE-organization.12 To the contrary, if 0ρ = , 
profits are strictly greater under EXP-organization since the international producer can 
                                                
12 Recall that local profits in the parent country are independent of the international producer’s choice f 
foreign market entry. 
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economize on fixed costs yet remain just as competitiv  in the overseas market. This 
implies existence of a cutoff transport cost level (0, )Iρ ρ∈  at which the international 
producer is indifferent between the two foreign entry modes. This cutoff level is 
implicitly determined by: 
 2 2( ) / 9 ( 2 ) / 9 0I aa c a c fρ− − − − − = . (26) 
Equation (26) has a unique solution in the interval ( )0,ρ . The relationship 
between transport costs ρ and the mode of foreign market entry is depicted in Figure 1. 
>Figure 1< 
We can now state our first proposition for the no-tax scenario. 
 
Proposition 1: If Iρ ρ< , the international producer chooses the EXP-organization and 
headquarters in country A. In contrast, if Iρ ρ≥ , the international producer chooses the 
MNE-organization and headquarters in country A. 
 
 The final item to consider is welfare in the no-tax equilibrium. Using the above 
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a c a c f if
V V
a c f if
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
 − − − − − ≤
− =  − − >
. (27) 
By virtue of equation (26), this implies that both country A and the international producer 
are strictly better off with the MNE-organization if Iρ ρ> , while both of them prefer the 















− = − − >
 (28) 
i.e. unless transport costs are zero, the host country always prefers the EXP-organization. 
This is because the transport costs incurred under this entry mode render the international 
producer less competitive. This raises profits of the national firm, which dominates the 
decline in the consumer surplus (under a linear demand function). Also, note that the size 
of the welfare loss is increasing in the transport c st. 
 Comparing (27) and (28), we can identify a potential conflict between the two 
governments. While welfare in the parent country is maximized by the international 
producer’s own decision regarding its entry mode, th  host country is unhappy with this 
decision if transport costs are significant, i.e. if Iρ ρ≥ . As will become clear in Section 
4, this gives an incentive for strategic profit taxation in the host country. 
In a final step, we can examine how world welfare depends on the entry mode. By 




( ) / 9 ( 2 ) / 9 / 6
5( ) / 72
a
a
a c a c f if
V
a c f if
ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ
 − − − − − − ≤
∆ =  − − >
. (29) 
Differentiating the right hand-side of (29) with respect to ρ , we see that the welfare 
differential V∆  has a unique maximum in interval ( )0,ρ  at ( )* 4 /11a cρ = − . On the 
one hand, higher transport costs ρ  render exporting more expensive and, therefore, 
exhibit a positive impact on V∆ . On the other hand, a higher ρ raises the social surplus 
loss in country B if the international producer decides for MNE-organiz tion instead of 
EXP-organization (see (28)). It is the interplay of these two opposing effects, which 
explains the (non-monotonic) relationship between tra sport costs ρ  and welfare 
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differential V∆ . The first effect dominates if transport costs are low, while the second 
effect is stronger if ρ  is sufficiently high. Of course, as ρ  approaches ρ , sales to 
foreign consumers fall to zero under EXP-organization. After this point, a further 
increase of transport costs has no impact on V∆ . Beyond that, we can note that the 
welfare differential is negative if 0ρ = , while its sign turns out to be ambiguous if 
ρ ρ= . 
To present our main results in the most transparent way, it is useful to impose a 
further parameter restriction (which will be relaxed in Section 5).  
 Assumption 3: 25( ) / 72 aa c f− > . 
Assumption 3 guarantees that V∆  becomes positive if ρ ρ= . Together with the formal 
properties outlined above, we can conclude that there exists a unique transport cost level 
( )0,Vρ ρ∈  for which world welfare is identical under both entry modes. This transport 
cost level is implicitly determined by  
 2 2 2( ) / 9 ( 2 ) / 9 / 6 0
VV a
a c a c fρ ρ− − − − − − = . (30) 
Comparing (26) and (30), we obtain V Iρ ρ> , i.e. there is a range of transport costs in 
which the international producer chooses the MNE-organization and reduces world 
welfare by doing so. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. 
>Figure 2< 
 One further remark is in order here. Together, Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that for 
any ρ , 0EXPV∆ > , according to (24). Hence, in the parameter domain we are focusing 
on in the subsequent analysis, it is always beneficial to be parent of the international 
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producer (irrespective of its mode of foreign market entry) if both countries set zero tax 
rates. 
 The above discussion isolates three important aspect  of our analysis. First, even 
in the absence of taxation, the equilibrium is not second-best efficient for certain 
transport cost levels, i.e. there is a potential for a Pareto-improvement if the entry mode 
of the international producer can be manipulated through national tax policies (and lump-
sum transfers are available to redistribute the welfar  gains). Second, since the parent 
country is always better off than the host country, there is an incentive to attract the 
headquarters of the international producer. Third, without tax revenues from inbound 
FDI, the host country prefers the international firm to choose the EXP-organization, 
irrespective of the transport cost level. 
In the next section, we account for these three aspct  and investigate how 
uncoordinated tax policies affect the equilibrium outcome. 
 
4. Tax Competition 
 We now focus on the role of taxes which are set (simultaneously and) non-
cooperatively in the stage prior to the international producer’s headquarters and entry 
mode decisions (which again precede the output game among the three firms). We can 
solve for the Nash equilibrium tax rates through backward induction. 
 Given the international producer’s decision on where to headquarter and how to 
structure its firm, profit taxes have no effect on output levels. Thus, the pre-tax profits of 
the firms in the various subgames of Section 3 do not change and after-tax profits when 
the international producer chooses an MNE-organization are given by: 
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 ( ) 21 ( ) / 9Ni it a c fπ  = − − −   (31) 
 
 ( ) 21 ( ) / 9Nj jt a c fπ  = − − −  , (32) 
and 
 ( ) ( )2 21 ( ) / 9 1 ( ) / 9MNEi i i i j at a c f t a c fπ π τ   = = − − − + − − − −    . (33) 
When the international producer chooses the EXP-organization, after-tax profits are: 
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  − − + − ≤  = 
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 = − − − >  
. (36) 
Note that under the EXP-organization, the international producer only faces local taxes in 
the parent country i.
 Given its entry mode, the international producer will choose to locate its 
headquarters in the country with the lowest overall tax burden. Under the EXP-
organization, the international producer locates in country i if i jt t< . Under the MNE-
organization, the international producer must also consider parent country taxes on its 
overseas profits. If i jτ τ= , then the parent country tax rate on host country profits is the 
same when headquartering in either country, and again the international producer locates 
in country i if i jt t< . 
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 Given that the international producer headquarters in country i, its choice of entry 
mode is similar to that in the no-tax case of Section 3, with the difference that tax policies 
become relevant. In particular, if the international producer chooses the MNE-
organization, it not only faces taxation by the parent country i but also taxation by the 
host country j on those profits earned in j. Thus, for given transport costs, there exists a 
host tax rate ( , ) 0j i it t t τ= >  at which the international producer is indifferent be ween 



















 − −− − − ≤= − −
 − >
. (37) 
For ( , )j i it t t τ> , the extra tax burden of the MNE-organization makes this entry mode 
unattractive and the international producer becomes an exporter. For ( , )j i it t t τ≤ , the 
extra tax burden is relatively small compared to the savings on transport costs and the 
firm becomes an MNE. The critical tax rate ( ),i it t τ  is increasing in it  when ρ ρ≤  and 
is decreasing in iτ  regardless of the transport cost level. Since jτ  only impacts an MNE 
headquartered in j, it has no effect on this critical tax rate and, therefore, also no effect on 
the international firm’s entry mode. 
 In the first stage of the game, the two governments simultaneously set their two 
profit tax rates: the non-discriminatory tax rate [0,1]it ∈ , which is applied to all local 
profits that accrue in country i and a discriminatory instrument iτ to tax overseas profits 
of an MNE. In general, iτ  can differ from it  because of double taxation relief. Following 
Davies (2003), we consider four different double taxa ion regimes: 
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if  offers no double taxation relief
(1 ) if  uses tax deductions
max{ ,0} if  uses tax credits











 −=  −

 (38) 
Under no double taxation relief, it is possible that the effective profit tax could be greater 
than one, in which case the MNE would actually owe more in taxes on its overseas 
profits than it earns there.13 Under tax deductions, the parent country deducts host 
country taxes from the tax base it uses to calculate the tax bill, i.e. it treats host taxes as 
any other cost of doing business in the host. Under credits, the parent country uses the 
pre-host tax level of profits as the tax base, but offers a limited tax credit for the host 
taxes paid. If the parent tax bill is greater than the credit (known as an excess limit 
position), the MNE must pay only the remaining amount to the parent. If the credit is 
greater than the parent tax bill (an excess credit position), the MNE owes no parent taxes 
on its overseas profits.14 Under the exemption method, the parent country does n t tax 
overseas profits at all. Of these four methods, credits are the most commonly employed 
double taxation relief method in real world, followed by exemptions.  
 Following Haufler and Wooton (1999, 2006) and Raff (2004), governments 
choose their tax rates to maximize the indirect utility of their own representative 
consumers. Assuming that tax revenues (Ti) are redistributed in lump sum fashion, this 
simply augments (4) so that income includes tax revenue.  
 We can now derive the Nash equilibrium tax rates, location choice, and entry 
mode.15 
                                                
13 This does not occur in equilibrium under the present model assumptions, as will become clear later on. 
14 Note that the MNE cannot use excess credits to offset the taxes owed on its domestically earned profits. 




Proposition 2: Nash equilibrium tax rates for country A are 0A At τ= = . Nash 
equilibrium tax rates for country B are ( )0,0Bt t=  if Vρ ρ≥ , ( )0,0Bt t>  if Vρ ρ< , 
and an indeterminate value of Bτ . The international producer headquarters in country A. 
If Vρ ρ< , the international producer chooses the EXP-organization. If Vρ ρ≥ , it 
chooses the MNE-organization. 
 
Proof: Since, for a given headquarters location and a given foreign market entry mode, 
profit taxes are non-distortionary and since the income of parent country i’s 
representative consumer is the sum of profits, tax revenues, and labor income, tax rates 
,i it τ  affect welfare iV  only to the extent that they affect choices of the int rnational 
producer with respect to its headquarters location and its mode of foreign market entry. 
Any tax rates in the parent country which leave these two choices unaffected are welfare 
equivalent. However, the welfare level in the parent country i also depends on tax rates in 
the host country j if the international producer chooses MNE-organization. In this case, 
welfare in the parent country i declines if the host country increases its non-
discriminatory profit tax rate jt . 
With these insights at hand, we can now proceed by showing that countries prefer 
to headquarter the international producer, irrespectiv  of the tax policy in the host 
economy. To do this, let us first suppose that the international producer is an exporter 
headquartered in country i. In this case, country j does not collect profit taxes from the 
international producer and country i’s welfare level is independent of jt . Thus, the result 
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from the no-tax scenario in Section 2 still holds and  country benefits from being the 
parent of the international producer, according to Assumptions 1 and 3. This provides an 
incentive for the well-known race to the bottom in profit taxation. 
 Second, suppose that the international producer is located in country i and has the 
MNE-organization. In this case, i’s welfare is: 
 ( )2 25( ) / 9 2 ( ) / 9MNEi a j aV a c f f L t a c f= − − − + − − −  (39) 
i.e. what it earned in the no tax case minus what is lost to country j’s taxes. Meanwhile j’s 
welfare is: 
 ( )2 2( ) / 3 ( ) / 9MNEj j aV a c f L t a c f= − − + + − −  (40) 
i.e. what it earned in the no-tax case plus what it collects in tax revenue. Comparing the 
two, we see that: 
 2 2( ) / 9 (1 2 ) ( ) / 9MNE MNE MNEi j j aV V V a c f t a c f ∆ ≡ − = − − + − − −   (41) 
which is positive, as af f>  (by Assumption 1) and 1jt ≤ . Thus, if the international 
producer chooses MNE-organization, it is better to be the parent country, even if the 
other country sets a positive tax rate. Again, this provides an incentive for a race to the 
bottom in profit taxation (in order to attract the MNE’s headquarters). 
 Putting together, ( , ) ( , ) 0i j j i j jt t tτ τ τ= =  is a best response to any combination of 
( , )j jt τ  with 0jt > , i.e. parent country i has no incentive to deviate from a policy with 
( , ) ( , ) 0i j j i j jt t tτ τ τ= = , irrespective of the tax rates in country j.
16 Best-response policies 
of both countries ensure that ( , ) ( , ) 0i j j i j jt t tτ τ τ= =  is realized in a Nash equilibrium 
(otherwise host country j has an incentive to underbid the tax rates of parent country i.) 
                                                
16 By virtue of equation (38), 0it =  implies 0iτ =  for any double taxation regime. 
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 If both countries set zero taxes, by Assumption 2, country A will headquarter the 
international producer as in the no-tax scenario. However, setting 0Bt =  is not 
necessarily optimal for the host country B. On the one hand, if the international producer 
decides for multinational production, a positive tax r te 0Bt >  raises total income BM  
and thus welfare in country B. On the other hand, the host country B can also use its tax 
rate to manipulate the international producer’s mode f foreign market entry. 




( 2 ) / 9
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 − −− <= − −
 ≥
. (42) 
Thus, if transport costs are above ρ , the international producer will choose the MNE-
organization irrespective of Bt . If, however, ρ ρ< , B can induce the firm to choose the 
EXP-organization by setting a high enough tax rate. Since, given an MNE-organization, 
B’s welfare is strictly increasing in its tax revenu, it will choose a tax rate at least as 
large as (0,0)t . Whether B exceeds this tax rate depends on whether the loss in tax
revenue is offset by the benefits of a change in entry mode from MNE to EXP, i.e. 
whether B sets a tax above (0,0)t  depends on the sign of: 
 2 2 2( ) / 9 ( 2 ) / 9 / 6MNE EXPB B aV V a c a c fρ ρ ρ ρ≤− = − − − − − − , (43) 
according to (28), (40) and (42). From (30), we see immediately that Vρ  is the level of 
transport costs at which the right-hand side of (43) equals zero. This implies that, for 
Vρ ρ> , B prefers the MNE-organization, while, for Vρ ρ< , it prefers the EXP-
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organization. Finally, Vρ ρ=  renders country B indifferent between the two entry 














=  = ≥
 (44) 
where host country j sets a tax rate which allows for MNE-organization in the case of 
indifference. Since Bτ  does not affect firm decisions, its value is indeterminate. This 
completes the proof.         Q.E.D. 
 
One important implication of non-cooperative tax competition in our framework is that it 
yields a second-best efficient equilibrium, so that potential Pareto-improvements are not 
possible for the underlying competitive environment in the goods market. This is, 
because the condition needed for country B to permit the MNE-organization ( Vρ ρ≥ ) is 
the same condition necessary for the world as a whole to benefit from the MNE-
organization. Since neither the international producer nor country A internalizes the 
impact of entry mode on country B, there is a negative externality which leads to a 
potential welfare loss in the absence of profit taxa ion. However, because B has the 
ability to force the international firm into the EXP-organization by setting a sufficiently 
high tax rate, it is able to correct for this externality. Thus, tax competition yields a 
heretofore unrecognized benefit: the ability to induce a welfare-improving entry mode. 
 Beyond its effect on utilitarian world welfare, tax competition also has 
distributional consequences in our model. While an MNE-organization is detrimental for 
the host country B if tax rates are zero, its ability to set a positive tax rate helps to offset 
these losses. As such, if Vρ ρ>  and the equilibrium entry mode is through FDI, host 
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welfare rises compared to the no-tax equilibrium. This yields a more even welfare 
distribution between the ex-ante symmetric countries. Therefore, if cross-country welfare 
distribution matters, permitting tax competition can yield an additional benefit over the 
no-tax equilibrium. 
 We conclude this section with two final remarks. First, if welfare is utilitarian, 
there is no role for tax coordination between countries. This differs from the results of 
Bjorvatn and Eckel (forthcoming), who emphasize the gains from coordination when 
governments use national tax policies to attract FDI from outside the world. It also differs 
from Davies (2003) and Chisik and Davies (2004) where the tax competition equilibria 
act as Prisoners’ Dilemmas, giving rise to mutually beneficial tax unions. Second, the 
double tax rule is irrelevant in our model. This matches the result found in Janeba (1995) 
where tax competition drives the parent country’s taxes “down to zero, such that the form 
of double taxation relief becomes irrelevant” (Janeba, 1995, p. 313). 
 
5. Robustness Analysis 
 The above results were derived under rather strong assumptions on parameter 
constellation and country characteristics (like symmetry in technology and factor 
endowments). It is the purpose of this section to probe the robustness of the above results, 
when relaxing some of these restrictive assumptions. 
A first modification is with respect to Assumption 3, where an arbitrary parameter 
constraint has been imposed on the relationship between operative profits of an MNE’s 
foreign affiliate and its fixed set-up costs.17 The consequences of giving up the respective 
parameter constraint are at the agenda of Subsections 5.1 and 5.2. A second modification 
                                                
17 The formal condition in Assumption 3 can be interpr ted in this way. 
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we are interested in is a change in the ranking of fixed costs. Following recent 
contributions in the FDI literature, we have imposed condition af f>  in Assumption 1. 
However, this assumption seems less plausible if a provision of headquarters services 
within the firm is of importance since this may create assets such as R&D that can be 
used in multiple plants at no additional costs. In this case, a ranking with af f<  may be 
more realistic. Note that this would imply that theMNE’s fixed costs are greater than a 
national firm’s fixed costs, but less than twice as great. Since conclusive empirical 
evidence on the size of local and foreign plant set-up costs is not available, we study the 
robustness of our results with respect to the fixed-cost assumption in Subsection 5.3. 
Finally, in Subsection 5.4 we address the role of (ex ante) asymmetries in the factor 
endowments of countries. 
5.1 Assuming 25( ) / 72 af a c f< − <  
 Giving up Assumption 3 but keeping Assumption 1, we may end up in a 
parameter constellation with 25( ) / 72 af a c f< − < . Then, by virtue of (29), world 
welfare is strictly lower under MNE-organization when ρ ρ≥ . This is because the fixed 
cost of setting up the overseas plant outweighs the ben fits this brings to consumer 
surplus and operative profits. Since world welfare is lower under MNE-organization than 
under EXP-organization if ρ ρ≥ , there also exist transport costs just below ρ  that yield 
lower world welfare under the MNE-organization. How far below ρ  this region extends 
depends on how large af  is. 
>Figure 3< 
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Figure 3 illustrates two possibilities when 25( ) / 72af a c> − . For illustrative purposes, 
Figure 3 also includes a baseline level of fixed costs 0 25( ) / 72af a c< − , i.e. a level of 
affiliate fixed costs that satisfy Assumption 3 and yield a world welfare differential like 
that in Figure 2. Recall that with this fixed cost, V∆  is positive for all Vρ ρ> , implying 
that world welfare is higher under the MNE-organization for sufficiently high transport 
cost levels. Now consider a fixed cost 1af that is just slightly greater than 
25( ) / 72a c− . 
This rise in fixed costs creates a parallel shift down in the world welfare differential from 
0V∆  to 1V∆ . As the figure shows, although the EXP-organization is more desirable for 
low and high transport costs, there exists an intermediate range between 1
V
ρ  and 2
V
ρ  for 
which the MNE-organization is still beneficial from an integrated point of view. Now 
consider a fixed cost 2af  that is significantly greater than 
25( ) / 72a c− . Then, the welfare 
differential becomes negative for any possible transport cost level ρ  and the EXP-
organization is always associated with higher world welfare. Such an outcome is 
represented by the 2V∆ -locus in Figure 3. 
 These changes in the welfare implications of entry modes impact the best 
responses. Since 25( ) / 72a c f− > , it is still desirable to be the parent country, regardless 
of the entry mode. Therefore, A’s best response remains 0A At τ= = . As before, B will 
attempt to use its tax rate to induce its preferred entry mode. If 1 2[ , ]
V V
ρ ρ ρ∈ , then B 
prefers the MNE-organization and will again set (0,0)Bt t= . Outside of this range, 
Country B has an incentive to set (0,0)Bt t> . If the fixed cost is large enough so that 
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2 0V∆ <  for all ρ  (as with 
2
af  in Figure 3), then B has an incentive to set (0,0)Bt t>  for 
all ρ .18 
As before, country B’s tax rate can potentially be used to enforce a better, 
welfare-improving entry mode of the international producer. However, unlike in Section 
4, it is not always able to do so. If ρ ρ≥ , to the detriment of world welfare the 
international producer chooses the MNE-organization (by Assumption 2), regardless of 
tax rates. In this case, B will set 1Bt =  in order to capture as much of the subsidiary 
profits as possible but will still be unable to correct the entry mode.19 
5.2 Assuming 25( ) / 72 aa c f f− < <  
In Section 4, the driving force behind the race to the bottom in tax rates was that 
countries desired to be the parent country. When 25( ) / 72a c f− < , this is not always the 
case. By (24), we know that under this alternative assumption it is detrimental to be the 
location of an exporter’s headquarters when ρ ρ≥ . While it is still the case that without 
transport costs (i.e. 0ρ = ) it is beneficial to be the parent, there will exist a critical 
transport cost level (0, )fρ ρ∈  such that for transport costs above this level, a country 
strictly prefers to be the host country instead of the parent country if the international 
producer chooses EXP-organization. This critical trnsport cost level fρ  is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
>Figure 4< 
                                                
18 Note that ( )0, 0 1t =  if ρ ρ≥ , according to (42). Therefore, ( )0, 0Bt t>  is only possible if ρ ρ< . 
19 If the two countries form a tax union and implement tax rates 1A B A Bt t τ τ= = = =  (under double 
taxation), then the international producer has an incentive to choose the EXP-organization even if ρ ρ≥ , 
in order to avoid non-negative after-tax profits. Hence, foundation of a tax union is beneficial in this case. 
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 For transport costs [0, ]fρ ρ∈  or ρ ρ≥ , best responses are exactly as they are in 
Section 5.1. For ( , )fρ ρ ρ∈ , however, things are different. In this range, the Nash 
equilibrium cannot involve an MNE at 0A At τ= =  since the host country would choose 
a tax rate to force the international producer intoan EXP-organization (as 0V∆ < ).20 
Furthermore, under this entry mode, both governments have an incentive to expel the 
international producer by raising their tax rates (a  0EXPV∆ < ). This then leads to a race 
to the top in profit taxation. Thus, in equilibrium, 1Bt =  (while the level of At  is not 
unique in general) and, by virtue of Assumption 2, the international firm headquarters in 
country A. 
If 1Bt = , then 0Aτ =  if country A offers credits, deduction or exemption (see 
(38)). The level of Bτ  is indeterminate as the international firm headquarters in country 
A. Finally, the international firm prefers EXP-organization if 1At < , while it is indifferent 
between the two entry modes if 1A Bt t= =  and 0Aτ = . Then, it will choose MNE-
organization, according to Assumption 2.21 
This race to the top is similar to that found in models with a mobile polluting 
firm. As illustrated by Rauscher (1995) and Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler (1995), in 
these “not in my backyard” models governments raise tax rates in order to drive the 
damaging firm out of their jurisdiction, leading to a similar race to the top. In our model, 
the damages come from a profit-stealing effect, as local production of the international 
                                                
20 Note that ( )22 2 / 9 0EXP aV V a c f fρ ρ ρ≤∆ − ∆ = − − + − >  and that 0
EXP
aV V f fρ ρ>
∆ − ∆ = − > , 
according to (24) and (29). Hence, EXPV V∆ > ∆  for any ρ  and thus 0V∆ <  for fρ ρ≥ . 
21 In contrast, if country A decides for double taxation and sets 1A At τ= = , the international producer 
prefers the EXP-organization to avoid negative after-tax profits. 
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producer reduces profits of the national competitor. Outside the literature on pollution, 
the possibility that a country can lose by being the parent of a mobile producer is not 
commonly discussed in the literature on tax competition for headquarters of mobile firms. 
However, the policy implications of such losses canbe severe if discriminatory measures 
which aim to drive unwelcome producers out of the market are forbidden by legislative 
rules. This is the case in several international agreements including Chapter 11 of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement and articles 94 and 96 of the treaty establishing 
the European Union. Emphasizing the possibility of unwelcome local investment is also 
warranted, as the focus among policy makers has so far been primarily on eliminating the 
special tax breaks afforded to multinational firms (see Haufler, 2001, for detailed 
discussion) and not on how to secure local firms from detrimental investment by a mobile 
producer. 
5.3 Assuming 25( ) / 72af f a c< < −  
 In this section, we consider a variant of the model in which it costs less to set up 
the overseas plant than to create the domestic plant (plus headquarters). Note that this 
implies that the total fixed costs of an MNE are between one and two times those of an 
exporter. 
For values of Iρ ρ< , none of our results from Section 4 change since 
( )0,0 0t < , so that a policy with 0A At τ= =  guarantees ( )0,0Bt t>  and headquarters 
of the international producer (with EXP-organization) in country A. Therefore, we focus 
on a parameter domain with Iρ ρ>  in the following analysis. To proceed, it is useful to 
consider a sub-domain with Vρ ρ>  first. In this case, we know from Section 4 that the
EXP-organization is not consistent with a best-respon e tax policy in country B. 
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However, unlike in Section 4, tax rates22 0A At τ= =  and ( )0,0Bt t=  are also 
inconsistent with best-response policies, as the MNE prefers locating in the high-tax 
country B. The reason for this is that, although revenues and v riable costs are the same 
across countries, fixed costs are now higher in the par nt country, due to af f> . Thus, in 
order to minimize its overall tax burden, the MNE will shift these costs (and its 
headquarters) to the high-tax location. This provides incentives for a mutual bidding up 
of tax rates, as countries would like to become parnt of the MNE (as long as tax rates are 
sufficiently low). 
However, the higher the tax rate in the host country, the less attractive it becomes 
to be parent of the international firm. By virtue of (41), we can determine a critical host 













 − − 
 (45) 
which is implicitly determined by 0MNE MNE MNEi jV V V∆ = − = . If the host country sets a 
tax rate ˆjt t= , the two economies are indifferent between being host or being parent of 
the MNE, while ˆjt t>  implies that the parent country i would benefit from adjusting its 
tax policy to expel the MNE. Hence, in a Nash equilibrium with MNE-organization 
ˆ
jt t≤  must prevail in the host-country. Furthermore, best-r ponse policies imply ˆit t≥  
in the parent country, so that host country j has no incentive to overbid country i. Finally, 
existence of a Nash equilibrium also requires it t≤ . Otherwise, the host country j could 
                                                
22 To fix ideas, let us assume that the host country, which is indifferent between the various double taxa ion 
relief methods, decides for tax exemption. 
23 Note that ( )ˆ 0,1t ∈  if af f> . 
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deviate to 0j jt τ= =  in order to attract headquarters of the internatiol producer who 
switches to EXP-organization if ( )0,0it t> . 
In the case of ρ ρ≥ , we have ( )0,0 1t = , so that existence of an MNE 
equilibrium is guaranteed (and country A as well as country B can become the parent of 
the international producer). In contrast, if ρ  is sufficiently close to Vρ , ( )0,0t  may fall 
short of ̂t . In this case, an equilibrium with MNE-organization does not exist. Since 
EXP-organization is also inconsistent with best-respon e policies of the two countries, 
there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies under such a parameter domain. In this 
case, coordination of national tax policies can serve a role by implementing a welfare-
improving firm structure (MNE) and sharing welfare gains between the two tax 
authorities (through lump-sum transfers). 
The final item to be determined is what happens at transport cost levels 
( ),I Vρ ρ ρ∈ . For this parameter domain, tax rates 0A Aτ= =  and ( )0,0Bt t>  have 
been identified as a candidate for a Nash equilibrium in Section 4. However, such an 
outcome is inconsistent with a best-response policy f country B if af f> , as deviating 
to a policy with ( )0 0,0Bt t< ≤  (and 0Bτ = ) would attract the international producer’s 
headquarters and render MNE-organization the preferred entry mode. This would 
definitely increase utility of B’s representative consumer. Hence, there are again 
incentives for bidding up the non-discriminatory tax r tes in order to attract headquarters 
of the international producer with MNE-organization. As outlined above, an MNE 
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equilibrium can only exist if ( )ˆ 0,0t t≤  holds and it is definitely ruled out if fρ ρ= , as 
( )0,0t  falls to zero at this transport cost level. 
5.4 Assuming A BL L>  
 For our final robustness check, we reinstate our original assumptions so that 
25( ) / 72af f a c< < − . However, unlike the baseline case, we now introduce an x ante 
asymmetry by assuming that country A has a greater labor endowment than country B 
does. Without loss of generality, we can assume that A BL Lλ= , 1λ >  (and keep BL  
constant at L). As long as production remains diversified in both economies, this 
modification has no impact on production costs. However, there is a market size effect, if 
the number of consumers rises pari passu with the number of workers. This leads to a 
modified inverse demand curve in country A, which is given by 
 /A Ap a D λ= − . (3’) 
 Analogous to Sections 3 and 4, we can then solve the no-tax equilibrium and the 
Nash equilibrium of the tax game for the case of market size differences. Since this is 
straightforward, we leave the respective formal analysis open for the interested reader 
and present the main results in a concise and intuitive way. 
First of all, in the no-tax scenario, the international producer still has an incentive 
to locate its headquarters in country A. This incentive is even stronger under EXP-
organization, as market size differences matter in the presence of transport costs (cf. 
Haufler and Wooton, 1999). However, the central result of a potentially suboptimal entry 
mode also survives in the case of market size differences and, since country B’s labor 
endowment is held constant, the parameter range where a suboptimal entry mode is 
 34 
realized – ( ),I Vρ ρ  – remains unaffected by changes in λ  as long as 1λ >  and 
production remains diversified in both economies (see (26) and (30)). 
 Let us now turn to the tax game. Since the negative effect of the MNE-
organization on host country welfare is still present if countries differ in their labor 
endowments, country B can again use its tax instruments to enforce a welfare-improving 
international firm’s mode of foreign market entry. Furthermore, noting the role of profit 
taxation in our analysis, it is straightforward that the tax rates in Proposition 2 also 
characterize a Nash equilibrium in the more general model variant with market size 




 The goal of this paper has been to demonstrate a heretofore unexplored benefit of 
tax competition for mobile firms. When an international producer chooses both where to 
locate its headquarters and how to serve the foreign market, this latter choice can yield a 
welfare loss not considered in models where the entry mode is exogenous. In particular, 
we show that there exist situations in which both the firm and the parent country prefer 
the multinational structure even though this is detrimental from a global perspective. In 
such a situation, the host country can use its tax rate to enforce a more desirable entry 
mode, thereby correcting for this externality. 
 This result should not be taken to imply that tax competition is always beneficial 
since our model lacks the features that often lead to problems such as inefficient output 
levels, underprovision of public goods and the like. N vertheless, our result adds to the 
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growing list of beneficial aspects of tax competition. The most appropriate view of tax 
policy must consider both the costs and benefits of non-cooperative taxation in order to 
arrive at the best implementation of policy. Our hope is that, by synthesizing the latest 
innovations from the literature on the formation of multinational firms with the literature 
on tax competition we have added a new facet to this debate. 
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Figure 4: Welfare Differentials when 25( ) / 72 aa c f f− < <  
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